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Presumption Junction: Honey, You Weren't Part of
the Function'-A Louisiana Mother's New Right to
Contest Her Husband's Paternity
I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of a divorce, Kassie Cravens sought to prove that
Chad, her soon-to-be ex-husband, was not the father of Jon
Michael Cravens, her three-year-old son, born during the first few
months of their marriage. Aware that the child's biological father
desired no relationship with Jon Michael, she had refrained from
filing any previous paternity action. Now though, as Mr. Cravens
sued her for a divorce, seeking interim alimony and permanent
legal custody of Jon Michael, she counterclaimed for custody,
challenging his paternity. The trial court granted her motion for a
DNA test and Mr. Cravens obliged with a sample. As Mrs.
Cravens expected, the DNA results admitted into evidence did in
fact exclude him as the child's biological father. But in seeking
custody, Mr. Cravens maintained his status as Jon Michael's legal
father. Mrs. Cravens conceded not only that Mr. Cravens was a
good father, but also that it would not be in Jon Michael's best
interests to sever their relationship. Entering a final divorce
judgment and awarding the Cravens joint legal and physical
custody, the trial court declined to hold that the DNA evidence
rebutted the presumption under Alabama statutory law2 that Mr.
Cravens, Mrs. Cravens's husband at the time of Jon Michael's
birth, was the child's father.
The appellate court rejected Mrs. Cravens's arguments that she
had standing to challenge Mr. Cravens's paternity and that the trial
court erred in holding the marital presumption of paternity
irrebuttable despite DNA evidence to the contrary. Because Mr.
Copyright 2007, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Title inspired by Schoolhouse Rock: Conjunction Junction (ABC
Television 1973). The title was originally suggested, in part, by B.R. Layfield.
2. ALA. CODE § 26-17-5(a)(1) (LexisNexis Supp. 2004) ("A man is
presumed to be the natural father of a child if ... [h]e and the child's natural
mother are or have been married to each other and the child is born during the
marriage .... ).
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Cravens "persisted in asserting his paternity," the court said Mrs.
Cravens lacked standing to challenge such paternity.
3
Such were the facts of a recent Alabama case.4 The Alabama
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the holding that a presumption of
paternity, persistently asserted by the presumed father, outweighed
scientific evidence demonstrating a high probability that Mr.
Cravens was not Jon Michael's biological father.5 Considering the
outcome in light of its social and legal ramifications, an illogical
consequence of the decision is apparent. While the decision
protects the child from being deprived of a legal father, the court
held that a mother lacked standing to challenge the presumption of
paternity, despite scientific evidence disproving it. A husband can
render the presumption irrebuttable simply by his act of will, i.e.,
by persisting in asserting it. What makes the decision of the
Alabama court significant is that it prohibits a wife, the mother of a
child born during marriage, from severing the child's legal
relationship with her husband.
The effect of such a decision in a Louisiana court would mean
that Mr. Cravens will pay child support until Jon Michael reaches
eighteen,6 with corresponding custody and visitation rights,7 which
8
are entitled to constitutional protection. His authority as father
will be subject, of course, to the limitations of the custody order,
but he can continually, as the mother may, have the order
modified.9 If Mrs. Cravens remarries, her new husband will need
Mr. Cravens's consent to adopt.' 0 Additionally, the obligation that
Mr. Cravens has as the father to support Jon Michael beyond the
age of eighteen, although diminished, would continue until his
3. Cravens v. Cravens, No. 2040004, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 523, at
*7 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 9, 2005), reh 'g overruled, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS
771 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 16, 2005).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 141 (2006); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
229 (2006) (requiring parents to "maintain their needy descendants").
7. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 131, 132, 136 (2006).
8. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (discussing the parental
right "to direct the upbringing" of children).
9. Either parent could attempt to effect a change of custody.
10. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 214 (2006); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1244
(2006).
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death; Jon Michael, too, has such an obligation to his father."
Furthermore, in Louisiana, Jon Michael would not only be an
intestate heir' 2 of his father, but also a forced heir,' 3 entitled to a
reserved portion of Mr. Cravens's estate until his twenty-third
birthday,' despite any will or testament of Mr. Cravens to the
contrary. The decision demonstrates that one's inability to contest
paternity, as well as any judgment concerning it, is an issue of
enormous importance, with lifelong ramifications for Mr. and Mrs.
Cravens and Jon Michael.15
Indeed, had the Cravens' divorce proceedings instead unfolded
in a Louisiana court, the court would have reached a similar result,
for until the summer of 2005, a mother had no legal right to
challenge the marital presumption. However, as a part of the
comprehensive revision of the laws on filiation passed in 2005,16 a
revision significant in itself, the Louisiana Legislature created a
mother's right to contest and establish the paternity of her child.
17
It has thus provided a mother with a means, albeit limited, of
rebutting the marital presumption.' 8 This in turn affects the legal
rights and obligations of both the wife's former husband and the
child. In the official comments to the new articles, the legislature
asserts that the purpose of the new right is to align the child
biologically within a married, intact family.' 9 But, given the
requirements of the new contestation action, Mrs. Cravens's
11. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 229 (2006).
12. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 888 (2006). Mr. Cravens is likewise a factor in
the devolution of Jon Michael's estate. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 891 (2006).
13. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1493 (2006).
14. The only category of children who can be forced heirs beyond twenty-
three are those who "because of mental incapacity or physical infirmity, are
rendered permanently incapable of caring for themselves or administering their
estates at the time of the decedent's death." Id.
15. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 cmt. (a) (2006) ("If the child
establishes paternity under this Article, all of the civil effects of filiation apply to
both the child and the father. Civil effects of filiation include the right to
support, to inherit intestate, and to sue for wrongful death.").
16. 2005 La. Acts No. 192, § 1.
17. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006).
18. LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2006) ("The husband of the mother is
presumed to be father of a child born during the marriage...
19. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 185 cmt. (b) (2006).
6352007] COM1ENTS
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
fortune in a Louisiana court would ultimately be the same, though
not for the same lack of standing as in Alabama.
With the facts and fate of the Alabama case in mind, this
comment focuses on Louisiana's new legislation affording a
mother the right to contest and establish the paternity of her child.
It strives to explicate the laws in a manner sufficient to reveal their
origin, meaning, and impact on a similar situation. Part II of this
comment provides an historical background on the marital
presumption found in Louisiana's pre-existing filiation law and the
heretofore limited, but incrementally expanding, means of
rebutting that presumption. This exegesis will highlight the
novelty of the mother's right. Part III explores the purpose of the
new law by comparing foreign and domestic sources containing a
similar right, some of which are more permissive and others more
restrictive than Louisiana's. Part IV examines new Louisiana Civil
Code articles 191 through 194, looking in detail at the statutory
requirements of a mother's contestation action. It also anticipates
that the interpretation of some requirements of the new
articles--the burden of proof, authentic act, and evidentiary
standard---may undermine the intended rigidity of their
application, but will still serve the purpose of aligning the child
within an intact family. Part V assesses how the new law, a right
provided to the mother, accomplishes its inherent objective of
serving the best interests of the child. Finally, Part VI concludes
by reiterating that, although article 191 is pioneering and positive
in the legal capability it affords a mother, her ability to act is
intended to be a limited one for the sake of the child.
II. BACKGROUND: REBUTTING THE MARITAL PRESUMPTION PRIOR
TO 2005
Legal filiation is the fact of biological parentage. 20 To
establish filiation, or paternity, as it is called from the father's
20. Succession of Robinson, 654 So. 2d 682, 684 (La. 1995). Filiation is
defined as the "fact or condition of being a son or daughter." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 661 (8th ed. 2004). Biological filiation is established by blood;
adoption is a substitute for biological filiation. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 214
(2006).
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perspective, is to demonstrate a biological connection. As noted,
the significance of determining filiation lies in accompanying
rights and obligations. 22  Before undergoing a revision in the
summer of 2005,23 Louisiana's law on filiation consisted of Civil
Code articles 178 through 21 1.24 Of relevance in this comment are
the articles providing for the presumption of paternity2 5 and the
restricted means by which a husband or his heirs or legatees could
rebut the presumption and disavow 26 a child, in effect severing any
legal recognition of a biological tie, as well as all related rights and
obligations between a father and child.27
Historically, a child born out of wedlock had few, if any, rights
and obligations with respect to his mother and father. 28  If
legitimate-born of the marriage--the child enjoyed complete
protection afforded by the rights and obligations confined to the
marital family.29  Thus, the pre-existing filiation articles and
21. Katherine Shaw Spaht & William Marshall Shaw, Jr., The Strongest
Presumption Challenged: Speculations on Warren v. Richard and Succession of
Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REv. 59, 63 (1976).
22. Helen Scott Johnson, Louisiana's Presumption of Paternity: The
Bastardized Issue, 40 LA. L. REv. 1024, 1025 (1980) ("Filiation ... establishes
from whom the child derives certain rights and to whom the child owes specific
obligations.").
23. This was part and parcel of the continuous revision of the Louisiana
Civil Code undertaken by the Louisiana State Law Institute. See generally
Louisiana State Law Institute, The LSLI Philosophy and Purpose,
http://www.lsli.org/philosophyandpurpose.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2006).
24. The articles now number 184 through 198. 2005 La. Acts No. 192, § 1.
25. "A child bom less than three hundred days after the dissolution of the
marriage is presumed to have been conceived during the marriage. A child born
three hundred days or more after the dissolution of the marriage is not presumed
to be the child of the husband." LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2004), amended
by 2005 La. Acts No. 192, § 1.
26. To disavow means "[t]o disown; to disclaim knowledge of." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 495 (8th ed. 2004).
27. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 187-189 (2004).
28. "Illegitimate children, though duly acknowledged, can not claim the
rights of legitimate children." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 206 (1972), repealed by
1983 La. Acts No. 431, § 1.
29. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 227 (1972) ("Fathers and mothers, by the very
act of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and
educating their children."), and LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 902 (1972), amended
sub nom LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 888 by 1981 La. Acts No. 919, § 1
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related provisions were principally geared towards privileging the
family unit anchored in marriage. One of the means of privileging
marriage over other intimate relationships was to favor the
husband as father of the child through a presumption of paternity.
The law reflected confidence that because only spouses owe each
other the legal obligation of fidelity-to refrain from sexual
intercourse with another and to satisfy the reasonable sexual
desires of the other spouse-30 --they did in fact honor these
obligations. As a consequence, the presumption of the husband's
paternity represented a reasonable assumption about the biological
paternity of a child conceived or born during marriage.
31
Jurisprudence attests that legislative and judicial concern in
formulating and applying the filiation articles has long centered on
the interests of the child. Rigorous application of the marital
presumption in Louisiana demonstrated a judicial intent to avoid
burdening children with the social and legal stigmas that
accompany illegitimacy.32 Interpreting the legislation, courts have
cited public policy concerns of "protect[ing] innocent children
against attacks upon their paternity," 33 and "against bastardizing
the innocent child, 34 as well as, historically, of maintaining and
protecting the "legitimate" family unit.
35
("Legitimate children or their descendants inherit from their father and mother,
grandfathers or other ascendants . . . . They inherit in equal portions and by
heads, when they are in the same degree, and inherit by their own right .... ").
30. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 cmt. (b) (2006) (citing Mudd v. Mudd, 20
So. 2d 311 (La. 1944); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
denied, 334 So. 2d 436 (La.), rev 'd on other grounds, 339 So. 2d 843 (La.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 961 (1976); Phillpott v. Phillpott, 285 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1973), writ refused, 288 So. 2d 643 (La. 1974)).
31. "The husband of the mother is presumed to be the father of all children
born or conceived during the marriage." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2004),
amended sub nom LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 185 by 2005 La. Acts No. 192, § 1.
32. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 849 (La. 1989).
33. Id. at 850.
34. Mock v. Mock, 411 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (La. 1982).
35. Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195, 1200 (La. 1979) ("Our jurisprudence
reflects unwavering dedication to the rule of strict construction of the articles
governing disavowal actions. The fundamental end achieved thereby is, of
course, preservation of the family unit, the foundation of our society. Further
638 [Vol. 67
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But rigorous application of the presumption, considered so
strong that it was difficult, if not virtually impossible, to rebut,
often resulted in absurd judicial decisions. In an effort to protect
children legally and socially from stigma, courts deemed them
legitimate despite strong, compelling evidence to the contrary. For
instance, Succession of Saloy3 involved claimants whose status as
legal heirs of a widow was challenged because of the widow's own
status as an "adulterous bastard.",37 The Louisiana Supreme Court
paid little heed to the fact that the putative heirs presented
themselves as children not of the widow's husband, but of a man
with whom she had an affair while still married. Finding the
claimants to be legal heirs, the court stated that the "sanctity with
which the law surrounds marital relations and the reputation and
good fame.., of the children born during their marriage is of such
inviolability that . . . children can never brand themselves with
declarations of adultery, illegitimacy, and bastardy... ,,38
Succession of Mitchell3 9 concerned succession rights of
children born of a woman and her brother-in-law, her husband
having disappeared shortly after marriage. 40 Though born years
after his disappearance, because the marriage had not been
dissolved, the missing husband was presumed to be the children's
legal father.41  The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that prior
jurisprudence obliged the trial court to recognize the husband as
the legal father, despite no evidence as to his whereabouts or
existence at the time the children were born.42 Regardless of the
"obvious fact" of the biological father's paternity, his
acknowledgment of the children, and his subsequent marriage to
the mother, "the law has made it impossible for this trial court to
considerations are the stigma of illegitimacy and resultant disinherison
attendance upon a successful disavowal action.").
36. 10 So. 872 (La. 1892).
37. Id.; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 182 (1885), repealed by 1979 La.
Acts No. 607, § 4.
38. Succession of Saloy, 10 So. at 876.
39. 323 So. 2d451 (La. 1975).
40. Id. at 452.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 453.
2007] 639
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
do what justice and common sense demand., 43 The lower court
had thus found them to be the legitimate children of the missing
first husband. But referencing certain decisions criticized for
"their inflexible, unrealistic, and unjust application of the
presumption of paternity," the supreme court reversed, instead
finding the children legitimated by the subsequent marriage of
their mother and biological father.44
In addition to judicial cognizance that stringent application of
the presumption could lead to illogical results, 45 the adoption of an
equal protection clause in the state constitution 46 gave the
Louisiana State Law Institute an opportunity to recommend
relaxing the rigidity of the presumption, if not eliminate it
entirely.47  The Louisiana Legislature responded in 1976 with
codal amendments rendering then-article 184's virtually
irrebuttable presumption of paternity rebuttable, though, at the
43. Id,
44. Id. at 456-57.
45. Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 850 (La. 1989) ("The Article 184
presumption was not without flaws. While it promoted the policy against
bastardizing children, it often failed to conform with reality. A husband, who
could not possibly be or who clearly was not the biological father, was
nonetheless conclusively presumed to be so."). The Alabama case, Cravens v.
Cravens, No. 2040004, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 523, at *7 (Ala. Civ. App.
Sept. 9, 2005), reh'g overruled, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 771 (Ala. Civ. App.
Dec. 16, 2005), is further evidence of the confounding implications of an
irrebuttable presumption. There, Mrs. Cravens was unable to sever Jon
Michael's relationship with her husband because he, as the presumed father,
chose to maintain his paternity, despite scientific evidence undermining it. Id.
As noted, the effects of the decision are lifelong consequences for all three
Cravens. The Smith court also cited Succession of Mitchell, 323 So. 2d at
456, which noted appellate decisions critical of "inflexible, unrealistic and
unjust application of the presumption of paternity to one born during an
undissolved marriage, where the mates have long since been living separate and
apart and where the mother has been living in stable union with another, who is
the actual biological father of the children."
46. Smith, 553 So. 2d at 850 n.4 (citing LA. CONST. of 1973, art. I, § 3 ("No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws . . . . No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because
of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations.")).
That provision partially protects children from discrimination because of their
illegitimacy of birth. Id.
47. Id. at 850.
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time, still only by the husband or his heirs.48 Subsequent decisions
of both the United States Supreme Court49 and the Louisiana
Supreme Court5° held that illegitimate children were no longer
permitted to be victims of discrimination. Indeed, they were
entitled to the constitutional protections and rights afforded to
legitimate children. Courts no longer needed to overlook facts and
common sense in order to find clearly illegitimate children
legitimate for their own sakes. Illegitimate status no longer
precluded legal protection of children. As a consequence, the
challenge of rebutting a presumption long revered as nearly
irrefutable became less daunting.
To defeat the marital presumption, often referred to as the
"strongest presumption in the law," 51 a husband 52 or his heirs or
legatees 53 could, and still may, institute a disavowal action to
disavow paternity. Historically, the husband had to file the
paternity suit within one month of learning of the birth of the
child.54 This time period has been incrementally liberalized over
the years, reflected in temporal requirements that have grown
longer and subject to exceptions and peremptive periods that have
become prescriptive periods. 55 Before the 2005 revision, the
48. 1976 La. Acts No. 430, § 1.
49. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding unconstitutional an
Illinois Probate Act allowing illegitimate children to inherit by intestate
succession only from their mothers, while simultaneously allowing legitimate
children to inherit by intestate succession from both parents).
50. Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (1980) ("The members of
the constitutional convention intended this article to include within its scope
unreasonable discrimination based upon illegitimacy .... The distinction drawn
by art. 919 between these acknowledged illegitimates and all other relations of
the decedent is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable. This conclusion ... is
but a further extension of a line of judicial determinations striking down
Louisiana laws which discriminate unconstitutionally against illegitimates.").
51. Mock v. Mock, 411 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (La. 1982).
52. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2006).
53. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 190 (2006).
54. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 191 (1885), repealed by 1976 La. Acts No.
430, § 2. Prior to repeal, article 191 was amended by 1968 La. Acts No. 158, § 1.
55. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2006). In 1999, an especially liberalizing
provision was added, suspending the time limit for a husband's disavowal
action. 1999 La. Acts No. 790, § 1. If the husband lived separate and apart
from the mother continuously during the three hundred days immediately
2007]
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husband had to file the suit within one year of learning, or from
when he should have learned, of the birth of the child.56 This time
period was arguably peremptive; thus, a presumed father who
failed to bring a timely action lost his right.57 Since the late 1990s,
the so-called peremptive time period58 was subject to "suspension"
if a husband lived continuously separate and apart from the mother
during the three hundred days preceding the child's birth.5 9
In either situation, the evidentiary standard required the
husband to establish by a preponderance of the evidence facts
reasonably indicating that he was not the child's father.60
Moreover, it was necessary that the facts be susceptible of
independent verification or corroboration by physical data or
evidence, and the legislation specifically listed scientific tests and
verifiable physical circumstances of remoteness as examples. 61 In
Mock v. Mock,62 the Louisiana Supreme Court extensively
preceding the birth of the child, prescription does not commence running "until
the husband is notified in writing that a party in interest has asserted that the
husband is the father of the child." Id. Due to the 2005 legislation, the time
period is now prescriptive, subject to both suspension and interruption. 2005
La. Acts No. 192, § 1.
56. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2004), amended by 2005 La. Acts No.
192, § 1. Under the 2005 revision, however, the action is subject to a liberative
prescription of one year, commencing to run from the day the husband learns or
should have learned of the child's birth. LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 189 (2006).
Additionally, prescription does not begin to run until the husband receives
written notification that a party has asserted that he is the father of the child if he
lived continuously separate and apart from the mother during the three hundred
days preceding the child's birth. Id. Comment (a) to new article 189 describes
the period of time for a disavowal action as "explicitly prescriptive"; as such,
former judicial interpretations of it as peremptive no longer stand. LA. Civ.
CODE ANN. art. 189 cmt. (a) (2006).
57. Pounds v. Schori, 377 So. 2d 1195, 1198 (La. 1980).
58. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 (2006). Peremption is not subject to
suspension or interruption. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3458 cmt. (b) (2006)
("Liberative prescription merely prevents the enforcement of a right by action;
in contrast, peremption destroys the right itself.").
59. See sources cited supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
60. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2004), amended by 2005 La. Acts No.
192, § 1.
61. Id.
62. 411 So. 2d 1063 (La. 1982).
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discussed legislative intent as to the character of evidence
necessary to meet this standard. Finding testimony alone
insufficient to meet the required standard, the court highlighted the
significance of putting forth facts disproving paternity. The
standard, said the court, "accomplishes the Legislative objective of
allowing the husband to disavow a child born to his wife where it
is clear that he is not the father, while retaining the public policy
against bastardizing the innocent child. 63
No longer as difficult to rebut as it once was, the presumption
still remains reasonable considering the duty of fidelity undertaken
by spouses. As a result of the presumption, more children are
considered legitimate, and a societal interest in "promoting whole,
stable families based on legitimate family ties" is furthered.
64
III. INTRODUCING ARTICLE 191: A MOTHER'S PATERNITY ACTION
Article 191. Contestation and establishment of paternity by
mother
The mother of a child may institute an action to establish
both that her former husband is not the father of the child
and that her present husband is the father. This action may
be instituted only if the present husband has acknowledged
the child by authentic act or by signing the birth
certificate.65
The provision of another means of rebutting the marital
presumption-for the first time via a mother's action--constitutes
a dramatic element of the 2005 revision. Though drafts of article
191 date back at least ten years,66 aside from its temporal
requirement, its language has changed little over the years. This
signals that, from its inception, the article's purpose has been well-
understood. Its significance and impact is tempered, however, by
the elements required to be proven by a mother to establish a cause
63. Id. at 1066.
64. Johnson, supra note 22, at 1026.
65. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006).
66. Louisiana State Law Institute, Proposed Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code of 1870, Marriage-Persons Committee 8 (Katherine S. Spaht, reporter)
(Aug. 25, 1995) (originally drafted as article 190).
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of action under article 191 and the demands made of her to attain a
judgment.
Article 191 provides a mother with a "contestation" action, not
a disavowal action.67 Though it may at first seem to threaten the
privileged family unit and the child in question, the mother's new
right does just the opposite. The right belongs to her, but focuses,
as reflected in the strict requirements to succeed in an action, upon
legally establishing the child as a member of an intact family of his
biological parents, evidenced by marriage. 68  The right thus
enables a mother to provide for her child. It should be considered
in this light, rather than as a means by which she disrupts stability
afforded by law to the child through filiation to a presumed father.
A. Comparative Sources of a Similar Right: Foreign Civil Code
Jurisdictions
New article 191 finds cousins in the legislation of other civil
code jurisdictions, 69 but the restrictions on a mother's right,
indicative of concern for whether the child is ultimately filiated at
all to a father, vary among countries. The provisions of many
jurisdictions appear far less restrictive than Louisiana's, involving
no requirement that a challenge to paternity of a presumed husband
be accompanied by an establishment of paternity, regardless of
who asserts the challenge. The Belgian and German7 Civil
Codes allow the husband, the mother, and the child to contest the
presumption of paternity. Italy's Civil Code provision states that
in all cases in which the father can exercise an "action of
disrecognition," so can the mother and the child, though the child
can only act when a major.72 Portugal, in addition to allowing the
husband, mother, or child to contest paternity, authorizes the
67. The contestation action requires that a mother simultaneously establish
paternity elsewhere; a disavowal action does not. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192
cmt. (2006).
68. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (b) (2006).
69. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (a) (2006).
70. CIv. CODE art. 332, 1 (Belg.) (J.-R. Trahan, trans.), available at
http://lexinter.net/LOTWVers4/CCIVB/index.htm.
71. Bflrgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGB] [Civil Code] § 1600 (F.R.G.) (J.-R.
Trahan, trans.).
72. CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 235, 6 (Italy) (J.-R. Trahan, trans.).
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Public Minister to institute an action. 73 Perhaps the broadest codal
provision belongs to Quebec, which allows "any interested party"
to contest filiation, thus implying that both the rights and
obligations owed to the child and by whom they are owed can be
directly affected by virtually anyone. 74 None of these provisions
demand anything more from a mother who brings an action than
from the father or the child, or necessitates that an establishment of
paternity accompany the contestation. The Netherlands, however,
limits the right more than the aforementioned jurisdictions. The
Dutch enable a mother to contest paternity only if she establishes it
elsewhere in the same act.
75
While bearing a strong resemblance to the Dutch legislation,
Louisiana's legislation was primarily modeled after articles 318
and 318.1 of the French Civil Code.' 6 Translated, article 318 of
the French Civil Code states that "[e]ven in the absence of
disavowal, the mother can contest the paternity of the husband, but
only for the purpose of legitimating the child, where, after the
dissolution of the marriage, she has married the true father of the
child. 77 The French thus prohibit a mother from only contesting
the paternity of her husband, which would in fact bastardize her
child; to do so, she must also legitimate the child by marrying his
true father.
B. Comparative Sources of a Similar Right: The Uniform
Parentage Act
Within the United States, Louisiana lags behind other states in
providing a mother with a right to contest paternity. Comment (a)
to new article 191 references Section 6(a) of the 1973 Uniform
73. CIV. CODE art. 1839(1) (Port.) (J.-R. Trahan, trans.), available at
http://www.giea.net/1egislacao.net/codigos/codigocivit/direito-familia/estabele
cimento filiacao.htm#ARTIGO 839.
74. CIV. CODE art. 531, 1 (Quebec), available at http://www.canlii.org/
qc/laws/sta/c- 1991/20050616/whole.html.
75. Burgerlijk Wetboek [BW] [Civil Code] art. 198(1) (Neth.) (Louis F.
Ganshof & Charles Petit, trans. (French)) (J.-R. Trahan, trans. (English)).
76. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (a) (2006) (referencing CODE CIVIL
[C. cIv.] arts. 318, 318.1 (Fr.)).
77. C. civ. art. 318 (Fr.) (J.-R. Trahan, trans.).
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Parentage Act ("UPA"), adopted by at least nineteen states, 78 as a
statutory scheme allowing the mother to disprove the paternity of
her husband.79 In comparing article 191 to the 1973 UPA
provision, the greater restrictiveness of Louisiana's legislation is
clear.
Under Section 6(a)(2) of the UPA, a child's natural mother, in
addition to the child or a man presumed to be his father, could
bring an action to declare the non-existence of the father-child
relationship presumed by the law. Section 9 stated that, in addition
to the natural mother, the child, each presumed father, and each
man alleged to be the natural father "shall be made parties" to the
action or given notice of it "if not subject to the jurisdiction of the
court."8 0  Temporal limitations required the party to bring the
action "within a reasonable time after obtaining knowledge of
relevant facts," but, peremptively, before the child turned five.8 '
Upon rebutting the presumption of paternity, a mother could, but
need not, establish paternity of another man if the other man were
made a party to the action.82  Judgment of the court was
"determinative for all purposes," and could include provisions
directed against appropriate parties regarding the duty of support,
as well as custody and guardianship of the child.83
The 1973 UPA underwent revision in 2000 and was amended
in 2002. The current Act maintains the marital presumption of
paternity, but omits the prior requirement that the presumption be
78. According to the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, as of December 2000, nineteen states adopted the 1973 UPA and
others enacted portions of it. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9(B) U.L.A. 296 (Supp.
2006), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/upa/final2002.htm
(located in the "Prefatory Note" below the table of contents and above the text
of the UPA).
79. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (a) (2006) (referencing UNIF.
PARENTAGE ACT § 6(a), 9(B) U.L.A. 410 (1973)). The comment to article 191
references the 1973 version of the UPA and not the UPA as revised in 2000 and
amended in 2002, wherein the noted section no longer exists.
80. UNWF. PARENTAGE ACT § 9, 9(B) U.L.A. 435 (1973).





rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. Interestingly, it now
.imposes greater restrictions on a presumed father's ability to deny
paternity, stipulating that the validity of a denial is in part
dependent on "an acknowledgment of paternity signed, or
otherwise authenticated, by another man.",85  The provision
concerning denial of paternity makes no reference to the mother.
86Nonetheless, the mother's right to contest paternity remains. The
time period within which she must act has, however, been
shortened. Section 607 of the UPA requires a mother seeking to
adjudicate the parentage of a child with a presumed father to
commence the action no later than two years after the child's
birth. 7 The UPA extends this time period in a situation where the
presumed father and mother did not cohabit or engage in sexual
relations during the probable time of conception and the presumed
father never openly held out the child as his own. If a court so
determines, a paternity challenge can be maintained at any time.89
To date, seven states have adopted the revised UPA.90 Of
them, only Texas and Wyoming appear more liberal in further
extending the time limit during which a disavowal action must be
brought by a presumed father. Texas extends the time limit to "the
84. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a) (amended 2002), 9(B) U.L.A. 311
(Supp. 2006) (stating, in pertinent part, "[a] man is presumed to be the father of a
child if... he and the mother of the child are married to each other and the child
is born during the marriage. . . ."). Regarding the omission of the requirement
that the presumption be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, the comment
to Section 204, updated in December 2002, states that "the existence of modern
genetic testing obviates this old approach to the problem of conflicting
presumptions when a court is to determine paternity." Id. § 204.
85. Id. § 303(1).
86. Id. §§ 303, 607 (comment to Section 607 states that the Section
"establishes the right of a mother .. . to challenge the presumption of his
paternity established by § 204").
87. Id. § 607(a). This time period applies to any party, presumed father
included, bringing an action to adjudicate parentage of a child.
88. Id. § 607(b).
89. Id.
90. Delaware, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and
Wyoming. Legislation adopting the UPA is pending in Illinois and Maine.
Uniform Law Commissioners: A Few Facts About the Uniform Parentage Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-upa.asp
(last visited on Aug. 26, 2006).
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fourth anniversary of the date of the birth of the child." 91
Wyoming mandates that an action to adjudicate parentage of a
child be brouht "in no event later than five (5) years after the
child's birth."
The reference to the 1973 UPA in the comments to Louisiana's
new legislation93 is puzzling as the temporal requirement of the
revised UPA bears a closer resemblance to Louisiana's article
191. 94 Both the 2002 UPA and article 191 require that an action
challenging paternity be brought within two years of the child's
birth. But, where the UPA relaxes this time period,95 Louisiana's
legislation provides no such extension for a mother bringing an
action under article 191. 96
Louisiana's legislation departs from the UPA in other
significant ways, revealing its greater restrictiveness. A mother in
Louisiana must establish paternity at the same time that she
contests it.97 She can accomplish each only by meeting a clear and
convincing evidentiary standard,98 a requirement removed in the
revision of the UPA. And, unlike the UPA, she must be remarried
to the child's true biological father, who himself must have
acknowledged the child.99
The liberality of a mother's right under the UPA, most evident
in a mother's ability to contest paternity without simultaneously
establishing it, may be perceived as an advantage to a mother, but
raises questions as to what it accomplishes for the child. In
contrast to a presumed father's denial of paternity, Section 607,
which authorizes a mother's right to adjudicate the parentage of a
child, leaves to the mother's discretion whether the child is
ultimately filiated to a father. This constitutes an additional point
of distinction between the UPA and new article 191. Placing the
91. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.607(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006).
92. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-807(a) (2005).
93. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (a) (2006).
94. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 607, 9(B) U.L.A. 341 (Supp. 2006).
95. See sources cited supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
96. The two-year period is peremptive. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193
(2006). See also supra note 57.
97. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006).
98. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (2006).
99. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006).
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child within an intact, married family represents an overriding
concern of article 191. Aside from the requirement that a
presumed father's denial of paternity involve acknowledgment of
paternity by another man, leaving the child filiated to two parents
who are not necessarily married, the UPA's provisions and
comments leave any similar consideration unmentioned. 100 The
UPA certainly does not attach a similar concern with a mother's
action.
IV. ARTICLE BY ARTICLE COMMENTARY OF A MOTHER'S NEW
RIGHT
The new legislation contemplates a situation in which the
mother's marriage to her former husband has dissolved due to
death or divorce and she seeks to biologically align her child to his
true father, her present husband. Thus, a presumption of paternity
applicable to her former husband, stemming from articles 185 and
186, constitutes a necessary element of an action under new article
191.101
A. Article 191
Article 191. Contestation and establishment of paternity by
mother
The mother of a child may institute an action to establish
both that her former husband is not the father of the child
and that her present husband is the father. This action may
be instituted only if the present husband has acknowledged
the child by authentic act or by signing the birth
certificate. 1
02
100. The Prefatory Note to the 1973 UPA indicates that declaring
"substantive legal equality for all children regardless of the marital status of
their parents" was a driving intention of its drafting. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT,
9(B) U.L.A. 379 (1973). The Prefatory Note to the 2002 Act reiterates this
concern. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9(B) U.L.A. 296 (Supp. 2006), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/upa/final2002.htm.
101. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 185, 186 (2006).
102. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006).
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Unlike many articles in the Louisiana Civil Code, the title of
article 191 appears at first glance to be indicative of its content.
The article provides a mother with an action to contest her former
husband's paternity but it requires that she also assert the paternity
of her present husband. Prerequisites to her action thus include a
divorce or death terminating her marriage to the presumed
father, 10 3 her marriage to the child's biological father, 0 4 the
biological father's acknowledgment of the child, 0 5 and the child
not having attained the age of two. 06
Though permissive in stating that a mother "may" bring an
action, the language of article 191 is demanding in what it requires
of her should she act. Joinder of the two actions--one to contest
her husband's paternity, the other to establish paternity of the
biological father--is obligatory. In other words, an action to
contest paternity must be joined with an action to establish it.'0 7
The utility or application of the article is thus extremely limited;
aside from the child, it necessitates the involvement of three
parties: the mother, her present husband, and her former husband.
The mother who wishes to contest the paternity of her former
husband can only do so if she has remarried and her current
husband attests, through an authentic act'08 or by signing the birth
certificate, that he is the father of the child. As the language of the
article indicates, the right is personal and belongs to the mother but
it depends on action by her present husband.' 9 This requirement
103. Id.
104. LA. CIV. CODE ANN, arts. 192, 193 (2006).
105. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006).
106. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2006).
107. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (c) (2006).
108. Louisiana Civil Code article 1833 sets forth the requirements of an
authentic act. In pertinent part, it is "a writing executed before a notary public
or other officer authorized to perform that function, in the presence of two
witnesses, and signed by each party who executed it, by each witness, and by
each notary public before whom it was executed." LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art.
1833 (2006).
109. The article and its comments convey that the action is a non-heritable
one, belonging only to the mother. This makes sense given the legislation's
intent to biologically align the child within a married family. For example, if the
mother were to pass away before commencing an action within the necessary
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illustrates one reason why Kassie Cravens, the mother in the
Alabama case, would fail in a Louisiana court: not only was Jon
Michael's biological father not a party to the action, but Mrs.
Cravens was not remarried to him, nor had he acknowledged the
child.
Implementing legislation for the new articles l  states that the
"mother of the child is the proper party plaintiff' in a contestation
action and that "her former husband and present husband are
proper party defendants.""' Additionally, the act directs that the
hearing may be closed to the public." 2 A judgment for the mother
terminates existing child custody and visitation orders, as well as
child support obligations. 13  In the case of the Cravens, Mr.
Cravens would lose custody and perhaps visitation rights'
14
time period, for another to bring it on her behalf would defeat the goal of
aligning the child biologically. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (b) (2006).
110. 2006 La. Acts No. 344, § 4.
111. Id. The act states, in pertinent part:
§ 403. Mother's contestation action; procedure
A. The mother of the child is the proper party plaintiff and her former
husband and present husband are proper parties defendant in the
contestation action provided for in the Civil Code.
B. The hearing may be closed to the public.
C. (1) A judgment rendered in favor of the mother terminates existing
child custody and visitation orders. However, the former husband in
extraordinary circumstances may be granted reasonable visitation if the
court finds it is in the best interests of the child in accordance with the
Civil Code.
(2) A judgment rendered in favor of the mother terminates the obligation
of the former husband to pay child support and revokes any court order
enforcing that obligation.
(3) A judgment does not affect any child support payment or arrearages
paid, due, or owing prior to the date the contestation action was filed.
D. An appeal from a judgment in the contestation action may only be
taken within thirty days from the applicable date in accordance with
Code of Civil Procedure Article 2087(A). The appeal shall suspend the




114. Under Louisiana Civil Code article 136(A), a judgment in favor of Mrs.
Cravens would render Mr. Cravens no longer entitled to reasonable- visitation
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concerning Jon Michael, but his obligation to support the child
would also cease. Appeal of a judgment in favor of the mother
must be quickly pursued; the act states that it must be taken within
thirty days." 5
As noted, the article requires that a mother's present husband
acknowledge the child. In a situation where he does so by
authentic act, potential confusion may loom where a present
husband has acknowledged the child, but subsequently revokes it
within sixty days of executing it, despite a judgment already
rendered by the court. The drafted implementing legislation allows
for such a case. Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:406 states,
in pertinent part, that a "person who executed an authentic act of
acknowledgment may, without cause, revoke it before ... [s]ixty
days of the signing of the authentic act of acknowledgment."'"16
Res judicata, however, likely alleviates cause for concern. If the
mother obtained a final judgment, any revocation of the authentic
act by the current husband may be a moot issue; her present
husband will have been adjudicated the father. In requiring the
mother's current husband to acknowledge the child by authentic
act, official comments to article 191 should convey that any
subsequent revocation of the acknowledgment, occurring after a
final judgment under article 194, will not defeat the establishment
of the current husband's paternity.
As noted in comment (e) to article 191, the consequence of a
successful article 191 action is that the marital presumption is
rebutted and paternity to the present husband is established." 17 But
as subsequent articles convey, article 191 merely sets forth the
requirements of a mother's cause of action to contest and establish
rights. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (2006). However, under article 136(B),
if the circumstances are deemed extraordinary, the court might grant Mr.
Cravens "reasonable visitation rights" if it determines such is in the "best
interest of the child" according to the listed considerations. Id.
115. 2006 La. Acts No. 344, § 4.
116. Id.
117. LA. Cwy. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (e) (2006) (noting that the
presumptions of prior articles 185 and 186 are rebutted by a judgment in an
action under current article 191).
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paternity of a child. To be successful in doing so, she must meet a
high burden of proof.
B. Article 192
Article 192. Contestation action; proof
The mother shall prove by clear and convincing evidence
both that her former husband is not the father and that her
present husband is the father. The testimony of the mother
shall be corroborated by other evidence.118
Article 192 states that a mother "shall prove by clear and
convincing evidence" two elements: (1) that her former husband is
not the father of the child; and (2) that her present husband is the
child's father. 119 The article also stipulates that the mother's
testimony requires corroboration by other evidence.
Again, the efforts required of the mother are two-fold: the
language of the article conveys the insufficiency of her solely
establishing her present husband as the child's father. Instead, use
of the word "both" indicates she must affirmatively disprove the
paternity of her former husband and affirmatively prove the
paternity of her current husband.
The burden of proof required--clear and convincing
evidence-and the corroboration of testimonial evidence are
similarly required of a husband who endeavors under article 187 to
disavow paternity of a child. 120 The Louisiana Supreme Court has
interpreted this standard, an intermediate one between
preponderance of the evidence and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, to require a party to persuade the trier of fact that "the fact
or causation sought to be proved is highly probable, i.e. much more
probable than its non-existence. ' 121  The standard is often
employed where policy concerns lead the court to disfavor a
particular type of claim, including an issue of filiation involving
the sanctity of the family.'
22
118. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 (2006).
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2006).
121. Chatelain v. State, 586 So. 2d 1373, 1378 (La. 1991).
122. Succession of Lyons, 452 So. 2d 1161, 1165 (La. 1984).
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The treatment of the evidentiary standard deserves
consideration. As in the revision to article 187,123 neither article
192 nor its official comments give insight into what evidence
meets this burden of proof. Article 187's predecessor listed types
of evidence that might constitute a "preponderance of the
evidence," including scientific or medical evidence such as blood
tests. 124  In Mock v. Mock, the Louisiana Supreme Court
determined that the legislature intended that standard to be
restrictive as to the types of evidence sufficient to constitute a
preponderance. 25 Focusing on the language in the article at the
time, requiring the husband to prove facts indicative of non-
paternity, the court concluded that the rebuttal of the presumption
of paternity could be achieved only by proof offacts susceptible of
independent verification or corroboration. 1
26
Yet similar statutory guidance was not included for the clear
and convincing standard. As noted, jurisprudence interprets the
standard to require that the existence of a fact be highly likely or
much more probable than not.127 But no language in the legislation
or its official comments illuminates the type of facts or data
intended to meet this burden. Moreover, the new article omits the
pre-existing requirement that facts or data be susceptible of
independent verification. The legislature, in effect, leaves to the
discretion of the courts the determination of what evidence suffices
as "clear and convincing," so long as it does not accept
uncorroborated testimonial evidence alone.
123. In the 2005 revision to article 187, the burden of proof was heightened
to clear and convincing evidence, but the requirement that proof of facts be
susceptible of independent verification by physical evidence was omitted. LA.
Civ. CODE ANN. art. 187 cmt. (a) (2006).
124. Prior to the 2005 revision, article 187 allowed a husband to disavow
paternity of a child if he proved by a preponderance of the evidence facts
reasonably indicating that he is not the father. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187
(2004), amended by 2005 La. Acts No. 192, § 1. The article mandated that such
facts be susceptible of independent verification or corroboration by physical data
and listed negative blood tests, unmatched DNA prints, sterility, physical
impossibility, and other scientific or medical evidence as the type of evidence
sufficient to meet the evidentiary standard. Id.
125. 411 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (La. 1982).
126. Id. at 1066.
127. Chatelain v. State, 586 So. 2d 1373, 1378 (La. 1991).
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Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:396 authorizes the court
to order the mother, child, and alleged father to submit to the
collection of blood or tissue samples as necessary in an action in
which paternity is a relevant fact, or in an action en desaveu
(disavowal). 128 A proposed revision to the statute, reflected in the
drafted implementing legislation, adds language allowing the court
to order the mother's "husband or former husband" to submit to
testing.12 9 But a court is not required to issue the order---and the
comments to the new legislation make no reference to the statute.
Therefore, although the new legislation imposes the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence, the text of the
legislation, because it does not preclude it, allows for a judicial
application of the standard that serves the underlying interest of
aligning the child within an intact, married family. By leaving
unarticulated what evidence constitutes clear and convincing, or
whether evidence of the same nature is required for each of the
mother's two obligatory actions, paternity may be disproved by
one type of evidence'3 0 while established by another.' 3 ' In other
words, a mother can tender blood-work contesting the paternity of
her former husband 132 while using evidence of an alternative
128. Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:396 states, in pertinent part:
[I]n any civil action in which paternity is a relevant fact, or in an action
en desaveu, the court may, on its own initiative, or shall, under either of
the following circumstances, order the mother, child, and alleged father
to submit to the collection of blood or tissue samples, or both, and
direct that inherited characteristics in the samples, including but not
limited to blood and tissue type, be determined by appropriate testing
procedure ....
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:396 (2000 & Supp. 2006). The court may make
the order "[u]pon motion of any party to the action made at a time so as not
to delay the proceedings unduly." Id. § 9:396(A)(1)(b). If the court finds
that experts agree that tests show "the alleged father is not the father of the
child, [then] the question of paternity shall be resolved accordingly. If the
experts disagree in their findings or conclusions, the question shall be
submitted upon all of the evidence." Id. § 9:397.3(D).
129. 2006 La. Acts No. 344, § 4.
130. Such as scientific or medical data.
131. Such as testimony of the current husband, his acknowledgment of the
child, testimony of the mother, and their marriage license.
132. In State v. Johnson, 753 So. 2d 388, 391-92 (La. App. 1st Cir. 2000),
the court stated that paternity is a factual question. Scientific testing, it said,
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sort---her testimony, corroborated by her present husband's, plus
their marriage license-to establish paternity of the current
husband. As long as both requirements are, according to the court,
proven by clear and convincing evidence, the language of the
article allows leeway for a trier of fact to find that the mother has
-met her burden, perhaps with the goal of honoring the underlying
intent of the legislation. 1
33
Article 192 does not dismiss the relevance of a mother's
testimony in meeting a clear and convincing evidentiary standard,
yet it requires that such testimony, plus that of her former and
present husbands, be corroborated by other evidence. Again, the
legislature leaves to court discretion, on a factual basis, the
determination of what constitutes corroborating evidence.
Comment (b) to article 187 provides that "other evidence" includes
"scientific or medical evidence, including the results of blood tests
or DNA prints, or medical evidence of sterility; evidence of
physical impossibility due to location at the probable time of
conception; or tangible evidence and testimony of lay
witnesses."' 34 Inferring that the legislature intended the same for
article 192, the variety of what constitutes corroborating
evidence--in particular the testimony of lay witnesses-leaves
open the possibility that the supposedly high clear and convincing
evidentiary standard can be circumvented by court discretion, all in
an effort to serve the child and the legislative intent. Therefore, it
is again plausible that the court's determination may hinge largely
on what suits the best interests of the child and is consistent with
the purpose of the legislation.
while not alone sufficient to prove paternity, is "persuasive and objective
evidence that can help establish paternity by a preponderance of the evidence."
One then wonders if, when coupled with testimony by the mother and her
current husband, such scientific testing meets a clear and convincing standard
disproving the former husband's paternity. The court can also call for genetic
testing sua sponte.
133. That goal is to align the child with its biological father and place it
within an intact family. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 cmt. (b) (2006).




Article 193. Contestation and establishment of paternity;
time period
The action by the mother shall be instituted within a
peremptive period of one hundred eighty days from the
marriage to her present husband and also within two years
from the day of the birth of the child, except as may
otherwise be provided by law.' 
35
Building upon the burden of proof required under article 192,
article 193 sets forth the temporal requirements of an article 191
action. Unlike the liberative prescription applicable to a husband's
action,136 a peremptive period governs the mother's action, leaving
no possibility of suspension or interruption. It forces the mother to
act quickly, limiting the time-frame during which she may institute
an action to one hundred eighty days from the marriage to her
present husband. Additionally, the dual peremptive requirement
mandates that, should the mother choose to act, she must also do so
within two years from the day of the birth of the child.
The comment to the article conveys that, in addition to the
aforementioned requirements of the mother, the peremptive period
restriction serves as another means by which the best interests of
the child are served. 137 The intent is to align the child with its
biological father early in life, before the child becomes attached to
someone else. Thus, the article departs from its French ancestor,
which requires that an action be instituted before a child reaches
the age of seven years. 138 The requirement is yet another reason
why Mrs. Cravens would fail in a Louisiana court; not only has she
not remarried, but the fact that Jon Michael is three years old
would preclude her from bringing an action.
135. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 193 (2006).
136. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 189 (2006).





Article 194. Judgment in contestation action
A judgment shall not be rendered decreeing that the former
husband is not the father of the child unless the judgment
also decrees that the present husband is the father of the
child. 3 9
Stated in the negative, article 194 reiterates that a mother
instituting an action to contest and establish the paternity of her
child will be successful only if she is able to simultaneously prove
that her former husband is not the child's father, while establishing
that her present husband is the child's father. The comment to the
article makes clear that the restriction on when a judgment will be
rendered stems directly from the underlying purpose of the
mother's new right---"to align biological and legal paternity more
closely and to establish the child as a member of an intact family
resulting from the marriage of the mother and alleged father."' 40 A
judgment will thus be decreed only when this purpose is fulfilled.
Though article 194 does not explicitly state as much, the
comment to article 192 notes that, as the result of a successful
article 191 action, legal paternity of the child transfers from the
mother's former husband to her present husband, removing any
filiation between the child and the former husband, as well as all
the consequences of filiation.1
4
'
V. ASSESSING THE NEW LAW: IS IT GOOD FOR THE CHILD?
Historically and today, Louisiana's law of filiation affords to a
presumed father a greater right than the mother to rebut the marital
presumption. Of a related note is that, as of 2005, the Louisiana
Civil Code provides a definition of maternity. 142 Such a definition
had never before been included since determining the mother of a
139. LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 194 (2006).
140. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 194 cmt. (2006).
141. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 192 cmt. (2006). See sources cited supra notes
6-14 and accompanying text.
142. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 184 (2006) ("Maternity may be established by
a preponderance of the evidence that the child was born of a particular woman,
except as otherwise provided by law.").
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child-she who gave birth-proved easy until advances in assisted
reproduction technology complicated the issue. Paternity, which is
not ascertainable from actual birth, is understandably more
difficult to establish. Therefore, the filiation articles, while
creating a presumption of paternity, enable a presumed father to
disprove it. Under article 187, a man can disavow a child as long
as he offers clear and convincing evidence within the prescriptive
period. 143  In effect, his action potentially leaves the child
unfiliated and without the stability and protections of a married,
intact family unit. A mother, under article 191, cannot so expose
the child, as she is required to establish paternity at the same time
as she contests it, while married to the child's biological father.144
The distinction between the respective requirements prompts a
question of equality of rights, but does not reflect the primary
concern of the filiation legislation. The articles instead focus upon
the child. Indeed, the requirements demanded for a husband's
disavowal action aim as well to restrict the ease with which a child
may be left unfiliated to a father, demonstrating that protecting the
child remains a primary focus of the entire legislative subject
matter.
Inequality of the rights of a mother and presumed father
pertaining to paternity is a salient issue. According to Planiol, the
right to disavow a child was exclusively vested in the husband
because "the father alone may pass upon his paternity. He alone is
able to decide whether the presumption the law raises against him
is or is not well founded., 145  The Code Napoleon, therefore,
refused to others, including the mother, the right to contest a
child's legitimacy while the husband was alive. Exception was
made for a husband's heirs when he died without having lost his
right to bring a disavowal action. 146 Until recently, the Louisiana
Civil Code did the same. But in assessing the significance of the
143. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 187 (2006).
144. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006).
145. Marcel Planiol, Exclusive Right of Action Vested in the Husband §
2:1422, in 1 TRAITt tLIMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 780, 781 (La. State Law Inst.
trans., 1959) (12th ed. 1939).
146. Id. at § 2:1422, at 782. Planiol distinguishes the husband's right that
passes to his heirs: "It is open to the heirs only to safeguard their pecuniary
interests .... In reality, the heirs do not enter a veritable disavowal." Id.
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mother's new right, attention should not center on the disparity
between the rights of the husband and those of the mother because
to do so would undermine the significance of article 191. Instead,
focus should be on what the mother's right, and particularly its
requirements, accomplishes for the child, namely providing
another means of giving the child the stability of an intact, stable
family unit. The right is a positive one in this regard, enabling a
mother to exercise some influence over who owes legal obligations
and may exercise rights to her child. But her influence cannot be
arbitrary; she must meet the requirements set forth in articles 191
through 194. In a successful action, the child remains
protected--more so than in the case of a disavowal action-as a
mother cannot leave a legitimate child unfiliated to a father. 1
47
Concerned with the effect social stigmas and legal penalties
stemming from illegitimacy have historically had on a child, the
presumption of paternity in the filiation articles remains rightly
focused on the child. The equal protection clause of both the state
and federal constitutions protect a child from suffering legal
discrimination. Therefore, today's concerns about the welfare of
children are primarily, but not exclusively, social. In looking at the
effect family structure has on a child, social science research
confirms the primacy of this concern. Benefits of the marital
presumption are apparent in research evidencing that certain family
structures, like married, biological parents, benefit a child more
than others 148 by decreasing any number of risks, including
poverty, 149 lower educational attainment, 150 juvenile delinquency
and conduct disorder,' 5' and early unwed parenthood.1
52
147. In other cases she can by not bringing a paternity action.
148. Brief for James Q. Wilson et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Appellants, Clinton v. California, No. Al10463, at 28 n.4 (San Francisco
Superior Court) (citing Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Marriage from a Child's
Perspective: How does Family Structure Affect Children and What Can We Do
About It?, CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF, June 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.childtrends.org/files/MarriageRB602.pdf (noting "[t]his research
brief on family structure does not compare outcomes for children raised by
same-sex couples to children in other types of families")).
149. Id. at 28 n.19 (citing I. Sawhill, Families at Risk, in SETrlNG NATIONAL
PRIORITIES 97-135 (H.H. Aaron & R.D. Reischauer, eds., Brookings Inst. Press
1999); Sarah McLanahan, Family, State, and Child Well-Being, 26 ANN. REV.
OF Soc. 703 (2000); Mark R. Rank & Thomas A. Hirschl, The Economic Risk of
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Childhood in America: Estimating the Probability of Poverty Across the
Formative Years, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1058 (1999)).
150. Id. at 29 n.24 (citing Paul R. Amato, Children of Divorce in the 1990s:
An Update of the Amato and Keith (1991) Meta-Analysis, 15 J. FAM. PSYCHOL.
355 (2001); Timothy J. Biblarz & Gregg Gottainer, Family Structure and
Children's Success: A Comparison of Widowed and Divorced Single-Mother
Families, 62 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 533 (2000); Zeng-Yin Cheng & Howard B.
Kaplan, Explaining the Impact of Family Structure During Adolescence on Adult
Educational Attainment, 7 APPLIED BEHAV. & SCI. REV. 23 (1999); William H.
Jeynes, The Effects of Several of the Most Common Family Structures on the
Academic Achievement of Eighth Graders, 30 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 73
(2000); Dean Lillard & Jennifer Gemer, Getting to the Ivy League, 70 J. HIGHER
EDUC. 206 (1996); Sara McLanahan & Gary Sandefur, GROWING UP WITH A
SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HELPS, WHAT HuRTs (Harvard Univ. Press 1994)). The
Center for Marriage and Families, part of the Institute for American Values,
states that:
As early as age three, children's ability to adapt to classroom routines
appears to be influenced by their parents' marital status .... Fourth
grade students with married parents score higher on reading
comprehension, compared to students living in stepfamilies, with single
mothers, and in other types of families . . . . The effects of family
structure on academic success continue through high school. Children
growing up with non-intact families engage in more adolescent
misbehavior, which harms grades and test scores. Family structure
substantially influences outcomes such as high school dropout rates,
high school graduation rates, and age at first pregnancy .... Students
from non-intact families miss school, are tardy, and cut class about 30
percent more often than do students from intact homes. These
differences exist in part because parents in non-intact family homes
appear less able to supervise and monitor their children . . . . For
children, growing up without their own married parents is linked with
higher rates of stress, depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem during
the teenage years-problems that can significantly reduce their ability
to focus and achieve in school.
Institute for American Values, Center for Marriage and Families, Research Brief
No. 1, 2-4, Nov. 2005, available at http://www.americanvalues.org/pdfs/
researchbriefl .pdf.
151. Brief for Wilson, supra note 148, at 29 n.25 (citing Chris Coughlin &
Samuel Vuchinich, Family Experience in Preadolescence and the Development
of Male Delinquency, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 491 (1996); Ross L. Matsueda &
Karen Heimer, Race, Family Structure and Delinquency: A Test of Differential
Association and Social Control Theories, 52 AM. SOC. REV. 171 (1987); George
Thomas & Michael P. Farrell, The Effects of Single-Mother Families and
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Paul Amato, a sociology professor at Pennsylvania State
University, finds that research "clearly demonstrates that children
growing up with two continuously married parents are less likely
than other children to experience a wide range of cognitive,
emotional, and social problems."' 53  But by "married parents,"
Amato means two biological married parents of a child. 154 The
distinction, according to Amato, has influence on the children, as
data indicates that children reared in stepfamilies fare little better
than those raised in single-parent households in terms of esteem,
conduct, academic success, and peer relations. He concludes that
"the marriage of a single parent [to someone other than the child's
biological parent] does not appear to improve the functioning of
most children."' 55 His conclusion stems from stepfamily research,
where studies consistently reveal that "children in stepfamilies
exhibit more problems than do children with continuously married
parents and about the same number of problems as do children
with single parents."'' 56  Amato attributes at least part of these
problems to the stress of stepfamily formation with divorce, which
often introduces instability into a child's life through "moving,
Nonresident Fathers on Delinquency and Substance Abuse, 58 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 884 (1996)).
152. Id. at 29 n.27 (citing E. Mavis Hetherington & John Kelly, FOR BETTER
OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED (2002); Andrew J. Cherlin et al.,
Parental Divorce in Childhood and Demographic Outcomes in Young Adulthood,
32 DEMOGRAPHY 299 (1995); Catherine E. Ross & John Mirowsky, Parental
Divorce, Life-Course Disruption, and Adult Depression, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
1034 (1999)). Researchers Martin Daly and Margo Wilson state that, "controlling
for the family's economic means, U.S. stepchildren receive reduced investment in
the form of support for higher education, routine medical and dental care, and
even food." Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, THE "CINDERELLA EFFECT":
ELEVATED MISTREATMENT OF STEPCHILDREN IN COMPARISON TO THOSE LIVING
WITH GENETIC PARENTS 7, http://www.psych.ucsb.edu/research/cep/buller/
cinderella%20effect%20facts.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2006).
153. Paul R. Amato, The Impact of Family Formation Change on the Well-
Being of the Next Generation, 15 FUTuRE OF CHILD. 75, 89 (2005).





adapting to new people in the household, and leaming new rules
and routines."'
57
Consider, for instance, a mother, such as Mrs. Cravens in the
Alabama case, who does not bring an article 191 action but
divorces her husband, the non-biological father of her child. If
Mrs. Cravens loses the right to bring the action because she no
longer meets its prerequisites, Jon Michael remains filiated to her
former husband. Various situations may then result. In one, Mrs.
Cravens remains a single mother, with social science indicating
that Jon Michael is likely to experience economic disadvantages,
the effects of which influence his academic success, home and
neighborhood environment, behavioral problems, and the quality
of parenting received. 1
58
In another scenario, Mrs. Cravens remarries, though not to Jon
Michael's biological father. Unless the stepfather adopts Jon
Michael through an infra-family adoption, a process in Louisiana
that, with a few exceptions, requires the consent of Mr. Cravens,
159
the stepfather remains biologically and legally unrelated to Jon
Michael; if Mrs. Cravens then dies, the "stepfather [may lose] any
legal claim to custody" as a parent, as the "legal nonrelationship...
stems directly from the biological nonrelationship."' 160  The
marriage creates a stepfamily and the potential for the
aforementioned implications. Moreover, it creates the possibility
for a "redivorce."' 61 The risks facing Jon Michael by virtue of his
157. Id.
158. Id. at 82-83.
159. LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. arts. 1193(2), 1246(4) (2004). However, under
Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:461, once Jon Michael turns seventeen, he
could be adopted by a stepfather without the consent of his biological father.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:461 (2004).
160. David Blankenhom, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST
URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 186 (1995).
161. Katherine Shaw Spaht, The Remnant of Forced Heirship: The
Interrelationship of Undue Influence, What's Become of Disinherison, and the
Unfinished Business of the Stepparent Usufruct, 60 LA. L. REV. 637, 663 n.140
(2000) (quoting Maggie Gallagher, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE: How WE
DESTROY LASTING LOVE 71 (1996)) ("Of all the risks to which remarriage
exposes children, one of the most common and least remarked is redivorce.").
Spaht also quotes Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman & Kay Pasley, Stepfamilies in 1984
and Today--A Scholarly Perspective, in STEPFAMILIES: HISTORY, RESEARCH,
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mother's remarriage are serious. Social science research reveals a
greater probability of abuse, physically and sexually, for
stepchildren as compared to a child raised by his two biological
parents. 162  In Fatherless America, David Blankenhorn quotes
William R. Beer's description of a stepfamily as a trolley car, with
people getting on and off.16 3  Life becomes increasingly
complicated, says Blankenhorn, "because the people involved have
divergent family histories and inherently conflicting commitments
-- many of which surface as real or symbolic conflicts between the
substitute father and the biological father."' 64  Blankenhom
acknowledges scholars praising stepfathers as society's "last, best
hope for a male presence in the lives of many children,"' 65 but
emphasizes that "social science data regarding outcomes for
AND POLICY 30 (Irene Levin & Marvin B. Sussman eds., 1997), who
acknowledge that "our post-modem era 'is characterized by sequential marriage'
and 'about 60% of remarried couples now dissolve their unions, and couples are
divorcing sooner than they did in the 1980s."'
162. Id. at 665. Spaht states that empirical studies "reflect that child abuse,
physical and sexual, occurs more frequently in a stepfamily with a stepfather
than in a family consisting of an intact married couple where the husband is the
biological father." Id. (quoting Patrick F. Fagan, The Child Abuse Crisis: The
Disintegration of Marriage, Family, and the American Community,
BACKGROUNDER 1115 (1997), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
Family/BG 11 15.cfm). Additionally, "studies from a diversity of countries
indicate that stepparents perpetrate both nonlethal physical assaults and sexual
abuse at much higher rates than genetic parents." Daly & Wilson, supra note
152, at 4 (citing evidence from child protection agencies and victimization
surveys). Daly and Wilson found that "Cinderella effects"--the differential
mistreatment of children in steprelationships as opposed to genetic parent-
child relationships-"are large regardless of marital registration"; i.e., whether
the mother is remarried or lives with her boyfriend. Id. at 5.
163. Blankenhorn, supra note 160, at 186.
164. Id. See also Spaht, supra note 161, at 668 n.170 (noting Glenn T.
Stanton's observation of Margo Wilson and Martin Daly of McMasters
University in Ontario. Wilson and Daly "explain that stepparents parent less
effectively, not because they do not know what to do; rather just the opposite.
They know what to do, but they don't have the internal motivation because
they don't receive the same emotional rewards from their stepchildren as
biological parents do." Glenn T. Stanton, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS:
REASONS TO BELIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN POSTMODERN SOCIETY 152 (1997)).
165. Blankenhorn, supra note 160, at 187.
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children in stepfamilies are remarkably consistent and almost
uniformly bleak."'
166
In a third scenario, Mrs. Cravens marries Jon Michael's true
biological father, but, again, has lost the right to bring an article
191 action. 167  If the right no longer exists, Mrs. Cravens's
marrying Jon Michael's biological father seems also to create a
stepfamily situation, or at least allows for some of the effects of
one. The benefits provided by an article 191 action are arguably
lost. Jon Michael, though now within an intact family unit with
both biological parents, may have formed a significant relationship
with his legal father, Mr. Cravens. Thus, any emotional and
psychological effects of the divorce and disruption of his prior
family unit are key factors to his adjustment to the formation of a
new family.
In light of the social science research, article 191 serves the
child well by allowing for biological alignment of the child within
a married family. 168 The right encourages a mother, knowing the
circumstances of her child's conception, to act when the child is
young. Expediting the action serves the best interests of the
child--the child remains within an intact family, the nature of
which changes at an early age, thus minimizing any negative
repercussions of a disruption to the family unit and enhancing the
child's likelihood of forming a nurturing relationship with, what is
in essence, a new father. The article affords greater protections to
the child by necessitating that his mother marry his true biological
father, thus decreasing potential for the risks evidenced within
stepfamilies. A mother cannot use the action to put her child in a
166. Id. at 190.
167. For instance, because Jon Michael is now three years old, his age
precludes her from doing so. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 191 (2006). The
child may also choose to establish paternity to his true father under article 197,
which states that a "child may institute an action to prove paternity even though
he is presumed to be the child of another man." LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197
(2006).
168. Spaht, supra note 161, at 666 n.149 (citing Stanton, supra note 164, at
152) ("[T]he biological relationship of child and parent is important in intact
families simply because the children are theirs. Both mother and father have an
equal emotional stake in their children's lives allowing them to extend a
tremendous amount of grace to their children.").
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single-parent home, 169 and it precludes her from using it to create a
stepfamily. The requirement that the biological father
acknowledge the child demands willingness on the father's part to
assume parental responsibilities and ensures that the child remains
filiated. The totality of requirements thus prevents a mother from
bringing an action to the detriment of the child.
Additionally, the article's relevance to the unspoken matter of
possible infidelity by the mother similarly renders the action of
benefit to the child. A major cause of marital dissolution,
infidelity can "reduce a husband's confidences in paternity.' 70 In
the Alabama case, question of Mr. Cravens's paternity apparently
did not present itself until Mrs, Cravens introduced it into the
divorce and custody proceedings. 17  While not the reason Mr.
Cravens sought a divorce, the birth of Jon Michael resulted from
Mrs. Cravens's affair. Had the divorce not been filed and the
paternity issue subsequently arisen, the issue could arguably then
have led to the dissolution of the Cravens' marriage. Already three
years old at the time of the divorce proceedings, Jon Michael's age
would again preclude Mrs. Cravens from bringing an article 191
action, and with good reason. By requiring a mother to bring the
action before her child reaches the age of two, the legislation
provides a greater chance of sparing the child exposure to the
stigma of adultery and the emotional confusion of a long
relationship with another father.
In providing a novel right to a mother and creating another
means by which the marital presumption of paternity can be
rebutted, article 191 strives to serve the best interests of the child.
But it may fall short in one circumstance, should the mother's plan
go awry. A practical problem may arise where a mother institutes
an article 191 action, proves that her former husband is not the
biological father, but fails to establish her current husband as the
169. However, she and the child may be left in a single-parent home if a
husband brings a successful disavowal action under article 187. See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 187 (2006).
170. David M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN
MATING 181 (1994).
171. Cravens v. Cravens, No. 2040004, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS 523, at
*2 (Ala. Civ. App. Sept. 9, 2005), reh'g overruled, 2005 Ala. Civ. App. LEXIS
771 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 16, 2005).
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father of the child. As themother's effort to rebut the presumption
has failed, the presumption remains attached to her former husband
despite clear and convincing evidence that he is not the child's
biological father. The child thus remains filiated to the former
husband. But the risk arises that the former husband, aware of
evidence disproving his paternity of the child, may initiate his own
disavowal action under article 187.
If the former husband disavows and the child was born during
the mother's second marriage, the presumption of paternity
transfers to the present husband, despite the fact that the mother
failed to prove her second husband's actual paternity. 172 On the
other hand, if the former husband disavows and the child was bom
before the mother's remarriage, because the child is no longer
filiated, the present husband, having already acknowledged the
child, is presumed to be the father.' 71 Thus, when the mother has
remarried, the child receives the protection of two presumptions; if
her former husband disproves that of article 185, the presumption
triggered under article 186 by her subsequent remarriage and her
new husband's acknowledgment of the child maintains the child's
filiation. Only in the rare absence of the article 186 presumption 7
4
or the present husband's disavowal 75 would the child be left
unfiliated. 17 6  In such a situation, the result is undoubtedly an
unintended consequence of a mother's thwarted action and not one
serving the interests of the child. 77 But remedies exist. Because
172. LA. CMv. CODE ANN. art. 186 (2006).
173. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 195, 196 (2006).
174. LA. CtV. CODE ANN. art. 195 (2006). The presumption is created by the
mother's subsequent marriage and the present husband's acknowledgment of the
child. Id. The presumption would seem only to not apply were the father to
rescind his authentic act after the contestation action, see supra note 116 and
accompanying text, or if the mother were to withdraw her concurrence, LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 195 (2006).
175. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. arts. 187, 195 (2006).
176. A similar outcome, though, may result from a disavowal action brought
by a presumed father.
177. Perhaps the situation can be avoided by the following additional
procedural requirement for an article 191 action: require the mother to first
establish her present husband's paternity by clear and convincing evidence
before allowing her to contest the presumption that her former husband is the
child's father.
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the child is filiated to no man, no prescriptive or peremptive period
applies to a father's ability to establish paternity to the child under
article 198.178 Therefore, the mother's present husband, should he
be the biological father, can bring an action. Similarly, under
article 197, the child can institute an action to determine paternity
without temporal limitation.179 Incidentally, if the child is a minor,
it is indeed the mother who, serving as the child's representative,
brings the action on the child's behalf.18 0 The mother thus again
finds herself in a position to influence rights and obligations owed
to her child and by whom they are owed.
VI. CONCLUSION
Returning to the case of the Alabama woman with which this
comment began-involving a mother, her husband, a three-year-
old child, and a biological father uninterested in a relationship with
the child-an understanding of Louisiana's new legislation
conveys that a similar, unsuccessful fate would befall her were she
to bring her action here. The Alabama court found that Mrs.
Cravens lacked standing to challenge the presumption of paternity
because her husband, presumed to be the father because Jon
Michael was born during the marriage, persisted in claiming
paternity of him. In Louisiana, article 191 would provide Mrs.
Cravens with standing to bring the contestation action. But she
would fail in her cause of action: Jon Michael is too old and has
not been acknowledged by his biological father, and Mrs. Cravens
has not married his true biological father. The assembly and
characteristics of the parties involved in the case demonstrate the
narrowness of a Louisiana mother's new right.
In enacting article 191, the Louisiana Legislature has
undoubtedly embarked into new legal territory. The law enables a
mother to act, but within seemingly stringent restrictions. Initial
178. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2006).
179. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 197 (2006). The child can bring such an action
even if he is presumed to be the child of another man. However, under the same
article and for succession purposes only, if the action is instituted after the death
of the alleged father, a peremptive period applies, requiring the child to bring the
action within one year from the date of death. Id.
180. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 683 (2006).
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judicial interpretation of the legislation will greatly affect the scope
of a mother's new right, particularly when considering the
discretion left to courts concerning the clear and convincing
evidentiary standard and the type of evidence sufficient to
corroborate testimony. In its wording of the articles, the legislature
has seemingly left the courts significant leeway to decide cases in
accordance with the best interests of the child. If the clear and
convincing evidentiary standard is not intended to be creatively
applied to loosen the restrictiveness of the mother's burden of
proof, legislators should describe the nature of evidence sufficient
to meet the standard. Such guidance would thereby also resolve
the issue of whether the contestation and establishment actions
demand that the mother offer similar proof. The most significant
aspect of the new law, though, is its restrictions, which aim to
serve the child. Each requirement demanded of the mother is
geared towards aligning the child biologically within an intact
family.
Similar to that of the Netherlands and France, Louisiana's new
legislation provides a mother with a narrow right to contest the
paternity of her child. Despite its limitations, however, article 191
is of great significance in affording a mother a means to rebut the
marital presumption and influence the rights and obligations owed
to her child and by whom they are owed. The restrictions of the
new legislation reflect a continued policy, supported by a wealth of
empirical research, favoring stability afforded to a child through
the marriage of his biological parents.
Lucie R. Kantrow*
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